sort of privileged access to truth about them, as if she was capable of making a transcendental judgment about her investigation. All understanding is in a “hermeneutic circle.” It is, simply, one of the ways of Being-in-the-world. No one is capable of stepping outside of it, as no one is capable of stepping outside of language.
Heidegger acknowledged the need for an ontological (ontos in relation to “being”) basis for conscious experience. Heidegger argued that Being was the most self-evident and universal concept  to reference beginning points in philosophical and phenomenological investigations.
In this same manner, one cannot isolate “accidents” from the conscious act as we cannot not “isolate” consciousness as some sort of transcendental subjectivity that had epistemic priority over its world. Conscious experience was already “ontically” engaged in and informed by the life-world.
What Husserl should have recognized from his own theory of intentionality (i.e. consciousness as always about something) was that consciousness only understands itself as consciousness by its perceptual engagement in the life-world. This was the significance of Heidegger’s concept of Being-in-the-world, often translated as Dasein.
 The Phenomenology Reader. Ed. Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney (London: Routledge, 2002), pg. 278-287. Hereafter, “PR.”  PR, pg. 78-108.
 Introduction to Phenomenology. Ed. Dermot Moran (London: Routledge, 2000). Hereafter, “IP.”
 Heidegger, Martin. Basic Writings, ed. Krell, David Farrell (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1993, pg. 311-341.
 Basic Writings, pg., 42-44.
 As David Krell has noted, it is not easy to distinguish between “ontic” and “ontological” in Heidegger’s philosophy. However, one can say that ontic “refers to any way of dealing with beings that does not raise the ontological question.” Hence, when one speaks of “ontic” one is talking about the way we most often are primordially engaged with other beings. “Ontological” entails an investigation of this engagement. See Krell’s footnote in Basic Writings, pg. 53.